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2ABSTRACT
Learning from safety incidents has typically been investigated amongst front-line workers in high
hazard contexts. In contrast this study collected safety incident data using audio-recorders from 21
respondents across the organizational hierarchy in two retail and one logistics company in the UK.
The diary data highlight the propensity for problem-fixing in a single-loop learning mode rather than
deeper, double-loop learning problem-resolution. The latter occurs amongst those with
organizational responsibility for safety, irrespective of hierarchical position. The observation of
violations is suggestive of prior learning of correct procedures and these data suggest that near-
misses are under-reported in organizations.
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31. INTRODUCTION
Safety in organizations is, for many, critically dependent upon reducing errors and eliminating
mistakes. Yet the occurrence of both errors and mistakes provides opportunities for individuals, and
organizations, to learn and to change, facilitating improved safety practice. Learning from errors and
mistakes however is not guaranteed. In organizations it is not uncommon for the same mistakes and
errors to be repeated and for safety incidents to recur (Buchanan and Denyer, 2015), even serious
ones. For example, accidents on the UK railways are attributed regularly to drivers passing signals at
danger. This caused an accident on the Great Western main line at Southall, London in September
1997 and another a few miles away on the same line at Ladbroke Grove, London in October 1999.
Less critical incidents recur more frequently in many organizations. Despite the organizational desire
to reduce errors and to eliminate mistakes and so minimize accidents and incidents, they are still
repeated. An important question therefore is what prevents organizations from learning from their
mistakes and errors to improve their safety performance?
According to Argyris and Schön (1974) learning involves the detection and correction of error. They
suggest two forms of learning. Single-loop learning simply fixes the presenting problem, while
double-loop learning challenges the existing situation to discover a different way of acting or
behaving. Fixing a presenting problem without addressing the underlying causes allows an
organization to continue with its existing policies and practices but results in the possibility of the
problem recurring. Conversely modifying organizational policies and practices through double-loop
learning may eliminate the possible recurrence of a particular mistake or error. Of course this can be
more costly in terms of time and resources. Organizations that emphasize single-loop learning more
than double-loop learning may therefore be less likely to learn from their mistakes and errors. In an
observational study of junior nurses in eight hospitals in USA (Tucker and Edmondson, 2003) argued
that single-loop learning (or simply fixing a presenting problem) was overwhelmingly the more
common response of these junior staff. They also suggested that the relatively dynamic, strongly
hierarchical organizational context actively discouraged double-loop learning. Their conclusion was
that incidents in such high risk environments were therefore inevitable, as staff became burnt-out
with the additional burden of managing the day-to-day irritations of a partially effective
organizational system.
Our study investigates the occurrence of single and double-loop learning amongst different
hierarchical categories of employees in response to safety incidents caused by a ‘gap’ between an
expected and an actual state or practice in organizations in more stable, less dynamic, low risk
environments using a novel audio-diary approach. It contributes empirically to our understanding of
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contexts, that employees in service-type environments predominantly adopt single-loop learning
rather than double-loop learning following safety related incidents. Following the well-rehearsed
argument (Tucker and Edmondson, 2003; Lukic et al., 2012) this may suggest that learning from
safety related incidents in these settings is uncommon. Second, the data suggest that organizational
role rather than hierarchical position in the organization, affects whether employees engage in
double-loop learning. Those with formal safety responsibility regardless of position are more likely to
engage in double-loop learning than those without such responsibility. Third a comparison of our
data with records of accidents and particularly near-misses in the case organizations suggest that
organizational estimates of near-misses are low and that there is substantial under-reporting. This
has implications for improving levels of organizational safety, if such near-miss data are used as
significant indicators of future incidents. Fourth, while diaries have been used in other fields to
capture lived experiences they have not been used in the field of safety research. Here we modify
this approach to make use of audio-recorders, which are a cost effective and accessible method for
collecting real-time data relating to safety incidents across a larger population than would be
possible by the ethnographic methods previously used in safety research.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 Learning in organizations
Edmondson and Moingeon (1998) and Shipton (2006) develop very similar frameworks along two
separate dimensions to categorise perspectives on learning in organizations. The first dimension
distinguishes between studies that have the individual as the unit of analysis and those that focus at
the organizational level. The second dimension considers whether the research is prescriptive and
interventionist, or descriptive. Organizational learning research is then populated against the
resultant 2x2 matrix. Both reviews consider the existence of organizational routines and practices as
evidence of prior learning at an organizational level, which is then typically communicated to new
employees through induction and other ongoing training, and codified in standard operating
procedures. The problematic nature of the connection between learning at an individual level and
learning at the organizational level is highlighted. One framework which encapsulates the interplay
between learning at the individual and the organizational level, is that proposed by Crossan et al.
(1999). The 4I framework suggests that through the processes of intuiting and interpreting,
individuals feed-forward their learning to influence the organization. The processes of integrating
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practices and the feed-back from the organizational level constrains and directs individual
behaviour and actions.
Feed-forward and feed-back loops are vital characteristics of learning which Argyris and Schön
(1974; 1978) incorporate into their models of single and double-loop learning. Single-loop learning
occurs when individuals after detecting an error seek to find a solution consistent with their framing
of the circumstances and one that permits the organization to continue with its policies and
practices unaltered. Alternatively, a double loop model of learning is apparent when an individual in
developing a solution scrutinizes the circumstances and the proposed action plan. These may lead to
a modification of the organization’s policies and practices. Single-loop learning takes the
circumstances as given and operates broadly within existing routines to increase organizational
effectiveness. This is essentially a closed and defensive response to the error (Argyris, 1976) that
seeks unilateral control of the environment and the task to protect self and others, so that no-one is
embarrassed by challenge. Causal reasoning reduces sensitivity to feedback permitting only
confirmation of existing expectations and so the freedom of choice of potential solutions is
restricted. Double-loop learning is quite different. Here individuals are encouraged to test publicly
assumptions and beliefs and to participate in the design and implementation of actions and to
create a wide variety of solutions that subsequently may feedback to affect individual behaviours in
the future. In this mode, substantial or radical organizational change is more likely than incremental
change.
Reason et al. (1998, pg. 292) define errors as “the failure of planned action to achieve their desired
ends”, and according to Argyris (1976) their detection and correction is key to organizational
learning. Alternatively, Tucker et al. (2002, pg. 124) suggest that learning can occur through problem
solving, the closing of “an undesirable gap between an expected and observed state that hinders a
worker’s ability to complete a task”. The difference between these two concepts of learning hinges
on the definitional distinction between ‘errors’ and ‘problems’ (Tucker and Edmondson, 2003).
However, in practice both errors and problems require the resolution of a discrepancy between
expected and actual practice. This ‘gap’ (Figure 1) once it has been observed (which is the starting
point for the cycle in the figure) it can be investigated and then often it can be resolved in similar
ways, irrespective of whether it came from an error or a problem. Correcting errors through single or
double-loop learning is considered to be analogous to first and second-order problem solving
(Tucker et al, 2002). First-order problem solving, like single-loop learning, fixes the presenting
problem but does nothing to prevent it reoccurring, whereas second-order problem solving like
6double-loop learning seeks to diagnose and alter the underlying causes of the problem to prevent
recurrence.
INSERT FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE
In addition to problems and errors, a third category of discrepancy between expected and actual
practice exists, namely rule violations. Desai (2010; pg 185) defines these “as the voluntary and
intentional departure of behaviours from rules governing how that behaviour should occur in
organizations” and notes that they are only infrequently incorporated into discussions of
organizational learning. Problems, errors and violations each provide opportunities or stimuli for
learning. However, we suggest that the type of learning that occurs depends upon the individual’s
response to the circumstance (Figure 1). An individual is able to observe a rule violation by another
colleague when they are aware of the organizational rules and operating procedures, most probably
learnt through prior training. Organizational level influences which transmit what behaviours are
acceptable affect individual behaviours through feedback mechanisms (Crossan et al., 1999). These
reinforce prior individual learning. Taking corrective action to fix a problem, but not addressing any
of the underlying causes indicates single-loop learning (or first-order problem solving). Escalating or
communicating a problem to more senior colleagues or external agencies to make wider systems
changes to resolve a problem and remove the underlying causes to prevent recurrence indicates
double-loop learning or second-order problem solving (Tucker and Edmondson, 2003). In Crossan et
al.’s (1999) framework this corresponds to feed-forward where the individual influences the
organization, suggesting possible changes to practices and providing an opportunity for
organization-level learning.
Problems, errors and violations therefore provide opportunities for observing and investigating
organizational learning. However, the type of learning that occurs depends upon whether individuals
simply fix the problem following the model of single-loop learning, or whether they make wider
system changes to remove the underlying causes following a model of double-loop learning. In these
contexts challenges to existing operating processes are likely to be unwelcome, and double-loop
learning discouraged (Fiol and Lyles, 1985). The focus is more likely to be on problem solving to
ensure technical improvements and the maintenance of the processes. These environments are also
likely to limit discretionary activity which facilitates experimentation and investigation, thereby
reducing opportunities for double-loop learning and emphasizing single-loop learning. Such
conformity tends to inhibit organizational learning (Edmondson, 2004). However such benign stable
organizational environments are increasingly uncommon, with current organizational environments
7being characterised as volatile, uncertain, complex and ambiguous (VUCA; Bennett and Lemoine,
2014), that require double-loop learning to resolve new organizational challenges.
2.2 Organization learning for safety
In their review of learning in the safety literature Drupsteen and Guldenmund (2014) concluded that
how learning occurs had been rarely studied, noting that safety research would benefit from input
from organizational learning theories, such as Argyris and Schön’s (1978) models of single and
double-loop learning. Prior to this review, Lukic et al. (2010) had developed a framework for learning
from incidents in the workplace that had four dimensions (learning process, learning participants,
type of knowledge, type of incident). The learning process incorporated the single and double-loop
learning concept of Argyris and Schön (1978) to question what kind of learning process was adopted
in response to the incident. Following empirical validation of the framework in the energy sector a
fifth dimension (learning context) was added (Lukic et al., 2012) but the choice of learning process
(single or double-loop learning) remained. Moreover, Lukic et al. (2012) noted the emphasis on
single-loop rather than double-loop learning in response to safety incidents, because there was no
incentive to share near misses and other small-scale incidents with others for fear of
embarrassment. Yet they acknowledged the importance of the need for awareness of small-scale
events in potentially mitigating further more serious safety incidents. This supports Drupsteen and
Guldenmund’s (2014) more general conclusion that existing safety learning studies report reluctance
for individuals to share information with others, and that learning in safety research implicitly adopts
a single-loop learning approach focusing mainly on ways to improve existing processes.
Accidents and near misses in organizations are often the result of problems, errors or violations and
they recur because of the failure of organizations to learn (Drupsteen and Guldenmund, 2014).
While rare and unusual events which can impact whole organizations may trigger organizational
learning (Lampel et al., 2009; Beck and Plowman, 2009) commonplace incidents perhaps impacting
single individuals or small groups also trigger organizational learning through either single or double-
loop learning, and occur more frequently. These latter incidents arising from a discrepancy between
expected and actual practices have been attributed to the acontextual nature of much formal safety
training. Somerville and Lloyd (2006) reported that actual working practices deviated from codified
safe working practices in a range of different sectors including aged care, coal mining, building
construction and fire and rescue services because the standardized safety training failed to take
account of the need to alter practice in response to the variation in social and physical environments
in which the workers operated. As a consequence everyday work experiences are often valued more
highly by individuals as safety-specific learning opportunities than formal safety training courses and
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by Størseth and Tinmannsvik (2012) in the rail and marine sectors too.
While the experience of errors and problems during the working day may trigger individual safety
learning through single-loop learning, the observation of rule violations indicates prior learning
through the awareness of standardized practices and expected behaviours, and may also act as a
stimulus for learning as individuals seek to understand or correct the discrepancy between expected
and actual practice. Sanne (2008) in an ethnographic study of railway maintenance technicians in
Sweden reported in detail how their practices deviated from written practice and why this deviance
went unreported. An earlier study by Lawton (1998) reported deliberate deviations from written
rules by railway shunters in the UK and identified three classes of violations: exceptional (unusual
circumstances requiring an unusual response); situational (based on a desire to keep the job going in
adverse circumstances); and routine (a short cut regularly taken). These three were differentiated
from unintentional violations arising from ignorance or inexperience, which correspond to error.
Mascini (2005) reported similar rule violations by workers in a coke factory in The Netherlands. In all
of these cases the deviation of actual practice from expected practice had been normalized and
accepted (Vaughan, 1999). Deviant practice became acceptable and rarely triggered challenge and
therefore no opportunity for individual learning. In these cases individuals had simply learnt a
different practice, or routine, from that anticipated by the organization.
In their review of safety management in organizations, Zanko and Dawson (2012, pg. 32) asserted
that, “we need to examine individuals in work settings, [examining] the workplace environment and
daily operating procedures as well as the tasks and activities that occur within context and over
time”. Such studies of individuals in their daily workplace would indicate where single or double-loop
learning occurs in response to the errors or problems that create safety incidents, including near-
misses, and where safety rule violations can be observed and responded to. Many of the studies in
the safety literature including those reported above focus on riskier or more hazardous
environments. Safety learning by individuals working in organizations in lower risk, less hazardous
contexts remains under researched. Moreover, it is unclear whether safety rule violations occurring
in risky high hazard environments are replicated in low hazard environments. In addition, Smallman
(2001) called for more safety research across hierarchical levels to indicate differences and
similarities between different groups. Safety research has typically focussed on front-line employees
and their supervisors (Zohar and Luria, 2003; Kapp, 2012), and ignored managers further up the
organizational hierarchy, who might have different experiences of safety, but also make a different
contribution to safe working in organizations.
92.3 Collecting data on safety practices
Accessing and collecting data about day-to-day activities and events relating to safety presents a
challenge (Zanko and Dawson, 2012) . An ethnographic approach allows in-depth observation, for
example Iszatt-White’s, (2007) investigation of violations of safety practices amongst UK
construction workers. An alternative, more cost-effective technique is the diary method, where
individuals record their actions in real time (e.g. Daniels et al., 2013; Katzeff et al., 2012). Diaries
allow the collection of qualitative data which can provide rich descriptions of events to facilitate and
understanding of day-to-day practices and inter-relationships (e.g. Symon, 2006) or to highlight the
salience of a sensitive issue such as ethnic identity (e.g. Atewologun, 2011). Thus, the diary method
is particularly suited to collect data on responses to problems and errors affecting safety in the
workplace and the recording of any violations of safety rules observed.
Using diaries as a mechanism for encouraging employees to record safety events and the outcomes
at the time of their occurrence allows us not only to discover those triggers to learning but also to
capture either explicitly or implicitly the courses of action taken in response to those triggers and
therefore whether learning was single or double-loop. The diary approach can reveal not only how
individuals respond to problems and errors, indicating the type of learning they display but also the
occurrence of safety rule violations and therefore deviation from taught practises and learned
routines. Recording a number of events by individuals spanning an organizational hierarchy over
time allows a rich picture to be developed that indicates what is being learnt by whom and how.
Responding to the challenges of both Smallman (2001) and Zanko and Dawson (2012) and using
Argyris and Schön’s model of single and double-loop learning as an organizing framework , we
investigate the occurrence of different types of learning in the execution of safe working practices by
respondents from across the organizational hierarchy in retail and logistics organizations. In order to
capture these learning incidents we adopted an audio-diary method, whereby respondents were
asked to use an audio recorder to capture the incident and their responses as the event occurred,
where possible within the constraints of normal, safe, working practice.
3. METHODS
This study formed part of a larger investigation of safety leadership and safety practices in service
sector organizations. An overwhelming majority of the workforce in both the UK (Office for National
Statistics, 2013) and across Western Europe and the US are employed in service industries. These
organizations characteristically have a highly centralized bureaucratic structure, with a dominant
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head-quarters developing policies and practices to be enacted locally without deviation. There has
been only limited investigation of safety leadership and safety practices in these contexts, for
exceptions see Barling et al. (2002), Bentley and Haslam (2001), Dejoy et al. (2004) and Kelloway et
al. (2006). The study from which data are drawn for this paper, sought to understand when during
the working day safety became salient to different categories of employees, and to determine the
nature of these triggers and what the response to them was. Taking a learning perspective, this
paper describes and synthesises the nature of learning (single/double-loop) in response to safety
incidents (problems, errors or violations) reported by a cross section of employees (front-line
workers, supervisors and managers) in major retail and logistics companies operating in the UK.
3.1 Data Collection
Using an event contingent data collection strategy, audio diary records were kept by 21
respondents. They recorded when, during their working day, safety became salient to them.
Respondents came from three organizations across six different sites. Two units each from two
different UK retail chains, one with more than 700 stores selling general merchandise and the other
DIY materials and home furnishings from more than 300 stores, were complemented by two
warehouses from a global logistics company with more than 100 locations in the UK. Participants
occupied one of three possible roles: manager, supervisor or front-line worker. Table 1 shows the
distribution of participants in different job roles across the three organizations.
INSERT TABLE 1 NEAR HERE
The participants, who were identified by their local manager, were asked to keep a diary for a period
of 14 days, recognising that they may not be working every day. These individuals were given a
digital voice recorder and then briefed by a research team member. Included in the briefing was an
explanation of how to use the voice recorder and a short description of the data collection protocol.
Diarists were asked to note when during their workday they became mindful of safety. For each of
the identified incidents they were asked to respond to five open-ended questions. They were asked
to identify when and where the incident occurred, why safety came to mind, whether anything
happened, who was involved and what the immediate outcome was. Finally, they were encouraged
to make their recording as close to the time of the incident as possible to minimize any hindsight
bias (Podsakoff et al., 2003; Ohly et al., 2010). They were encouraged also to record at the end of the
day if nothing happened during the day to make safety salient to them. To increase participation,
and following the suggestion of Atewologun (2011) and Poppleton et al. (2008), personalized text
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message reminders were sent by research team members to participants every few days
encouraging them to complete their dairy. Upon completion of the two week period of data
collection, the recorders were collected by a research team member. Participants were debriefed to
better understand their experience of keeping the diaries. Notes of these conversations were
captured.
3.2 Data analysis and coding
The audio recordings for each incident from every participant were transcribed. The rich
narrative from the transcripts were analyzed using template analysis (King 1998). This is a widely
used technique suited to managing and reducing narrative data to a set of themes derived from the
literature (Patton, 2005). The literature identifies a range of possible triggers or events which can
increase the salience of a safety issue. For example, these include an identified ‘hazard’; an actual
‘accident or injury’; witnessing a ‘violation of a safe working practice’, ‘H&S meetings’ or
‘training’. Our data were classified and sorted according to the type of trigger or event which raised
safety awareness. From our data, triggers included, for example: ‘spilt paint’, an individual ‘banged
their head’, staff walking into the warehouse ‘without hi viz’. The data were also coded according to
the nature of the outcome of the event, for example ‘removing a potential hazard’, ‘recording an
accident ‘and ‘reviewing policy’. To ensure our coding of the data was robust, three researchers
together coded the narrative for each incident against the template. Differences in interpretation
were reconciled through discussion.
For many, but not all, of the incidents it was also possible to identify the learning opportunity they
presented to the respondent. Following Tucker and Edmondson (2003) we differentiated between
single and double-loop learning. Single-loop learning (or first-order problem solving) responses were
indicated by respondents recording that they found solutions immediately to presenting problems,
often without the help of others, although like Tucker and Edmondson (2003) we also included in
this category incidents where help was obtained from close peers. Incidents where respondents
referred problems to more senior colleagues or external agencies were coded as double-loop
learning (or second order problem solving), as Tucker and Edmondson (2003) did in their study of
problem solving in hospitals. Violations were indicated by deviation from either standard operating




The 21 respondents made a total of 162 separate reports covering at least 84 person-days of data
collection; not everyone identified the day on which they reported. Twenty two reports stated that
“there haven’t been any incidents today”, or simply “no issues”. Of the remaining 140 reports over
half (n=77) were suggestive of some form of learning. Forty-eight reports referred to situations that
were resolved immediately by the respondent with or without the help of a peer, indicating single-
loop learning. Thirteen reported situations were referrals to other people more senior than the
respondent, suggesting double-loop learning. There were 16 recordings which related to the
observation of violations of standard operating procedures. The remaining 63 reports covered a
range of topics such as ‘attending training’ or ‘H&S meetings’, ‘reading briefings’, ‘checking
equipment’ and reflections on safety, such as “we talk about Health and Safety and we talk a good
game but ultimately it always comes down to meeting the customers’ requirements”, and “I think
sometimes [Health and Safety] can go slightly overboard, sometimes it can be a bit drastic, but if
used correctly it can be brilliant”.
4.1 Single-loop Learning
Table 2 shows the number of reports made by different groups of workers in the case organizations
that indicate single-loop learning. This was most frequently presented by front-line workers in retail.
In several cases this was because they were dealing with equipment that had been incorrectly placed
or secured. In other instances stock in the stock rooms had been incorrectly positioned creating a
hazard, requiring them to reposition it. For example, “overhanging objects in the aisle, so they’re
below the ladder height, so as you push them along they’ll fall on top of you. So I just relocated them
to a better space”. Another front-line worker in a different store described the following hazardous
situation. “There is a suitcase in a box and a microwave perched on top, the microwave has got a
warning sticker for 21 kg. There is a heavy item on top of a small item. There also appears to be an
item of furniture in a box which is essentially propping up this microwave. If this item was moved it
would definitely fall. What I’m going to do is attempt to rearrange some of the stock to a more safe
and logical order so that it doesn’t present a hazard of danger to anyone passing by”.
INSERT TABLE 2 NEAR HERE
At other times these front-line workers were dealing with slip hazards on the shop floor. These were
created by spillages mainly of paint or other liquids, but sometimes of food and pencils (Table 3).
Rain water too creates slip hazards for customers. One front-line worker noted that the rain water
“was mopped up swiftly with paper towels to ensure the safety of our customers” and a “ ’caution
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wet floor’ yellow sign was put out”, and another worker at a different store, “made sure there’s no
water on the floor and there are signs set up as well”.
INSERT TABLE 3 NEAR HERE
A number of front-line respondents noted that they had asked for assistance from their immediate
colleagues to solve a problem. One reported asking for assistance to carry a heavy item to the back
door of the shop. Others reminded team members not to leave “kick stools on the shop floor”,
because they create a trip hazard, and told “them where to store [the kick stools] in the warehouse”.
While there were nine slip hazards reported by respondents in the retail sector there were no such
reports by those from logistics. Fewer incidents leading to single-loop learning occurred in the
logistics context (Table 2). Nevertheless, front-line workers in logistics did observe that equipment (a
pump truck) had been incorrectly placed (left in the walkway) and needed to be moved. They also
reported engaging with peers to resolve problems and prevent accidents or improve safety. One
worker noticed that “an operator was reloading a Little York disposable cleaning cloth machine,
stood in from of the main door between the fulfilment operations and returns. I’m not quite sure how
the machine ended up in front of the door but clearly there was an infringement of Health and Safety
and she was exposed to some risk as the door would have opened onto her, so I asked her to move
into a safe area to re-load the machine”. Another “found someone had entered the warehouse
without high-vis [high – visibility vest]. I just reminded him and he’s gone back to the security”. But
he concluded by asking the question, “why security allowed him to go into the warehouse without
high-vis?” (This is contrary to company policy).
Another difference between respondents from logistics and retail was that the managers in the
logistics company reported fixing faulty equipment. For example, “scales that had not been PAT
(portable appliance testing) tested within the last 12 months” were “taken out of use”, and “faulty
lights in the gents’ toilets, which was leading the toilets obviously to be in complete darkness … so
the toilets were closed until we could replace the light bulbs”. No managers in the retail context
reported incidents that could lead to single-loop learning.
4.2 Double-loop Learning
Double-loop learning events were much less common than first-order problem solving incidents
(Table 4). Overall, only 13 of these events occurred compared to 48 first-order problem solving
events (Table 2). With two exceptions these 13 events were all reported either by managers or
front-line workers with a responsibility for safety, because they were either nominated Health and
Safety Champions or the union representative.
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In the logistics context, managers reported an incident where some of the boxes returned from a
retail store contained human excrement. They had raised this with the retail customer and UK Mail,
the delivery service, and both organizations were “going to do an audit”, while the logistics company
was going to “start an internal investigation”. These managers were also exploring alternative
options for disposing of waste from the floor scrubber with the site management agency. Both
examples involved interactions with other organizations.
In contrast front-line workers typically reported issues to superiors in the hierarchy anticipating that
they would resolve the problems. For example, the Health and Safety Champion in one of the retail
stores reported that “we would like a mirror installed on our services yard because it has been used
as a rat-run, people coming up the wrong way and there’s a blind turn where the forklift prongs
would be at engine height for any car coming up there. It’s an issue that [the manager] will raise with
the landlord, as we can’t actually do anything outside of what we’ve already done in the yard”.
Similarly the union representative in the warehouse raised “an issue in regard to drivers being sent
out on vehicles that haven’t been risk assessed for the outlets that they’ll be delivering to. This has
been brought up in different ways, i.e. with managers, team leaders and operation controllers”. But,
“the desired outcome hasn’t occurred”. He also raised a training issue with HR where concern was
“raised by some people in regards to chemical spillages and not having a fuller understanding on
how to deal with them”, despite them having been trained.
4.3 Learning from Violations
Violations of organizational safety rules were more often reported by the nine respondents from the
logistics company than the 12 respondents from the retail context. Moreover, with one exception
reported by a supervisor, all other violations were reported by front-line staff and never by
managers.
In the logistics company the violations typically centred on the interaction between people and
equipment. First individuals were wrongfully present in the same space as equipment. The
supervisor “caught a forklift driver talking to a pedestrian in the aisle and she was sitting on the
actual truck …. I explained that no-one sits on the trucks whilst they are talking and the other person
should be at least six to eight feet away”. One front-line worker “saw pickers entering the racking
system where the drivers are in operation, instead of waiting until drivers have left the aisle”, while
another at the same warehouse on a different day noted that “there was an operator stood with a
forklift truck in the racking aisles whilst retrieving [an item] from a high location”.
15
Second, individuals were operating equipment apparently without regard for co-workers. One front-
line worker reported “a prime case today with a guy being ignorant on his truck and ignoring the
signs of having to beep his horn when coming through the doorways, nearly hitting someone”. A
similar incident occurred at a different warehouse where one front-line worker “witnessed one
person enter and exit … on their reach truck not using their horns to alert people that they’re coming
through.”
Other types of violations were apparently related to attempts by workers to accelerate the
processes. In one warehouse a front-line worker “found the person who is booking the stock actually
when the double-stack pallets arrive, instead of taking pallets down and scanning the labels from the
pallet, she jumped on the pallet and doing this actually to get from one to another pallet”. At the
same warehouse on an earlier occasion a front-line worker “noticed that one of the operatives had
to stand on the pallet to retrieve the stock”. At a different warehouse the union representative
observed that safety guards were not being used, “we have straps for the FLT (fork-lift truck) drivers
to use when putting away and replening. These aren’t being used because it slows down the
process”. He concluded, “managers are aware of this occurring and are quite happy for it to continue
because it meets the customers’ requirements”.
In the retail company, the violations were often situations immediately resolved by the respondent.
Some situations involved equipment. For example one worker noticed that “the ladder had already
been opened and left out”. According to an earlier interview ladders were supposed to be closed and
hung up when not in use. The same worker also noticed that the door on one of the stock cages
“wasn’t pinned back correctly”. If they are open doors on cages are supposed to be pinned back to
prevent injuries particularly cuts. In both instances this respondent corrected the mistake. Other
circumstances involved stock. At a different store a front-line worker noticed that “a fairly large
item, possibly a wardrobe in a flat pack, had been propped up next to the fire door …. It has been
stacked in such a way that it is essentially blocking the fire door. It is only one item but under
regulations all fire doors must be kept clear at all times”. This was subsequently moved.
5. DISCUSSION
Learning is widely regarded as being purposeful, leading to improvements in efficiency, productivity
and innovation (Dodgson, 1993), which indirectly may impact organizational safety by shaping
organizational goals and priorities. Learning may also affect organizational safety directly through
the attention given to the processes of incident analysis and impact (Drupsteen and Guldenmund,
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2014). However, Drupsteen and Guldenmund (2014) also report that the processes of learning from
safety incidents has limited empirical foundation and that Argyris and Schön’s theory of single and
double-loop learning has relevance for safety improvement. Adopting Argyris and Schön’s
perspective on learning we have investigated empirically the types of learning that may be apparent
from different self-reported safety incidents.
Single-loop learning is considered to be more common in organizations than double-loop learning
(Argyris and Schön, 1978). While the latter challenges assumptions underpinning policies and
practices and encourages more radical change, the former seeks to achieve pre-determined goals,
making only minor adjustments to practise based on feedback to achieve them, and to maintain
organizational stability. In this study single-loop learning is evidenced in reports by respondents of
how they fixed a presenting problem either single handed (e.g. moving misplaced and therefore
unsafe stock) or with others using a standardized procedure (e.g. cleaning up a spillage). This was
the more common learning event across all staff. In these cases no information was shared with
others. Organizational change to effect improvements to safety practices was unlikely and incidents
inevitably recurred as evidenced by the respondent who noted the incorrect juxtaposition of a
suitcase and microwave, also a few days later reporting another problem with stock; a potential trip
hazard.
Single-loop learning from safety incidents has been found to dominate within the high hazard energy
sector (Lukic et al., 2012), potentially driven by a focus on increasing efficiency (Carroll et al., 2002)..
This was an organizational priority for the retail and logistics companies involved in the current
study. Carroll et al. (2002) suggest that a centralized bureaucratic structure where control is
exercised by strict adherence to standardized rules and procedures precludes challenge and
encourages single-loop learning. Furthermore, Tucker et al. (2002) argue that an emphasis on first-
order problem solving (or single-loop learning) limits or even prevents organizational learning.
Nevertheless, single-loop learning may be effective and efficient for individuals and groups
undertaking routine tasks to achieve their objectives in stable environments. However, it may be
detrimental to the individual (Tucker and Edmondson, 2003) and organization in the longer term
(Carroll et al, 2002) if small-scale incidents are indicative of a wider organizational malaise that will
trigger a larger event if they remain unattended too.
Double-loop learning occurs when individuals have the opportunity to challenge the assumptions
upon which organizational policies and practices are based and to feed-forward to influence them
(Crossan et al., 1999). Inevitably, this requires communication with others who are often in senior
positions within the organization or sometimes with external agencies. Both of these types of events
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were evident in the data but not extensively. Carroll et al. (2002) note that it is difficult for many
organizations to maintain the necessary openness to allow this internal dialogue, and furthermore it
may be wasteful of resources to do so. There is a tendency for organizations to impose controls and
so constrain learning. Nevertheless following an incident, individuals may engage purposefully with
organizations for example by escalating issues to senior management. Lukic et al. (2013) suggest that
active engagement of individuals may be fostered by organizational factors that encourage
participation, solicit input and provide feedback. In this study, employees with responsibility for
safety communicated with others, including external organizations, offering the possibility for
double-loop learning (Tucker and Edmondson (2003). Predictably these individuals were the
managers and supervisors, who were accountable for organizational safety and who perhaps had
more time for discretionary activity in their roles. Surprisingly, however, a number of front-line
workers also reported communicating with senior colleagues or external agencies. One explanation
for this was that these front-line workers had a particular interest in health and safety because of
their additional roles, which permitted them to raise safety concerns with their superiors or with
external organizations, and to more confidently challenge the status quo. Challenge is one of several
individual characteristics identified by Edmondson (2004) that contributes to organizational learning.
Recognizing safety violations necessarily indicates that the observer has been taught and has learnt
the required procedures that govern safe behaviours and actions. The organization has thus
influenced the individual (Crossan et al., 1999). Furthermore, violations of safety rules are deemed
to be opportunities for organizational learning (Alper and Karsh, 2009; Desai, 2010) because they
reveal potential problems with existing organizational practices. Many of the reported incidents
appear to correspond to Lawton’s situational violations (Lawton, 1998), where organizational
pressures override safety considerations. These instances may also indicate heedlessness (Weick and
Roberts, 1993). Individuals failed to pay attention to their immediate surroundings, by driving
without sounding their horn to warn others. In this study the violations have been restrictively
ascribed to incidents observed by others where individuals were “caught in the act”. Nevertheless
some of the incidents caused by errors and defined here as single-loop learning opportunities may
also indicate earlier violations of standard operating procedures confirming the observation that the
distinction between violation and errors may not always be clear (Reason, 1990). For example, in
several cases the presenting problem (ascribed here as an error with potential for single-loop
learning) was a situation created by the violation of a known standard operating procedure by
another person, e.g. the failure to close and replace a stepladder in the retail store or a pump truck
left in the walkway of the warehouse. These observations of violations of a policy or a practice by
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another person also present the opportunity for single-loop learning, as indicated in Sanne’s study
(2008) of Swedish railway technicians.
Problems, errors and violations are the focal incidents for learning in this study. Many of these
constitute ‘near-misses’ defined as an event that has the potential to cause harm (Health and Safety
Executive, 2004). For example blocking a fire door, leaving a ladder unattended on the shop floor
and driving a reach truck through doors without sounding a horn to warn nearby workers all
constitute ‘near misses’. However, the numbers of near miss incidents formally reported in these
organizations at the time of the study were small. None of the retail stores reported a near-miss
incident during the period of study, but we identify six incidents from the data that could be
described as near-misses. Similarly in the logistics company four respondents at one warehouse
observed a total of four incidents yet the records for the whole warehouse employing almost 900
people in the same period revealed only eight accidents and six near-misses. It seems likely
therefore that actual numbers of incidents exceed the reported numbers. This finding directly
challenges the veracity of near-miss data. If near-miss data form the foundation for guiding safety
policies and practices in organizations then greater emphasis needs to be placed upon accurate
reporting. Zhao and Olivera (2006) provide three broad categories of reasons why errors may not be
reported: emotional reasons; situational ambiguity and lack of awareness. Awareness of near miss
reporting systems and their ease of use, especially in target driven environments, like retail and
logistics, are considered to be significant factors in the design of accessible error reporting systems
(Pfeiffer et al., 2010). The audio recorders used in this study encouraged respondents to remain
attentive to safety issues and potentially provide an effective and accessible means of reporting near
misses.
As far as we are aware diary methods have not been used in safety research. On the basis of this
study, audio diaries have the potential to make a significant contribution to safety research in three
areas.. Firstly, they may help to develop our understanding of the actual practices of safe working by
revealing how employees respond to circumstances around them. Secondly, drawing on Snook’s
(2000) theory of practical drift, the use of diaries may help to reveal where ‘actual practices’ in the
work place differ from the ‘espoused practices’ of the documented safety policy and written
procedure. This might also allow a more in-depth study of safety violations complementing the time-
intensive, costly ethnographic approach adopted by Sanne (2008), Mascini (2005) and Iszatt-White
(2007), Thirdly, diaries such as those in the current study can reveal when safety becomes salient to
employees. The high reliability organization literature indicates that mindfulness is critical for safe
operations in high hazard settings (Weick and Sutcliffe, 2001). The use of audio recorders which are
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convenient to carry, simple to operate, unobtrusive and potentially permitting ‘real-time’ reflection,
allows an examination of mindfulness in a variety of organizational settings.
The study has a number of limitations associated with the method and the analytical framework.
Recording the responses of 21 respondents for two weeks to identify learning from safety related
incidents is a small sample, dictated by access to and availability of volunteers, and caution should
be exercised in extrapolating beyond these contexts. In order to collect sufficient data and to
accommodate temporal variation in safety perhaps due to seasonal work pressures, we recommend
data collection for a longer period of one month. Other diary studies albeit in different contexts have
longer durations. Our time frame was a compromise decision reached after discussion with line
managers and participants in the organization. It sought to avoid the task becoming too onerous and
the consequent participant response rate diminishing to unacceptably low levels. Therefore we also
recommend where possible greater involvement with potential participants before commencing the
study so that the benefits of participating are clear to all. This would also ensure that email or text
message reminders to complete the diary, which we also recommend would be viewed favourably
and actioned. Our respondents did not always remember to make recordings. Some were more
diligent that others despite reminders. It is important to test the clarity of the written and oral
instructions and participant understanding of what is required prior to commencing the study.
Participants in our study provided a variety of responses ranging from a brief observation (of a few
words only) to a more lengthy observation and reflection. A fifth and final recommendation would
be to use audio diaries rather than written ones because they are portable, convenient to use,
accessible and can potentially capture data ‘in the moment’ rather than waiting to write up the
recollection of the event at a later time.
6. CONCLUSION
Learning for safety was indicated in this study of retail and logistics organizations in three ways. First,
employees adopted a single-loop model of learning in response to safety incidents, which echoes
other work and suggest that organizational learning from the more common-place and frequently
occurring safety incidents was limited. A propensity for single-loop learning may help to explain why
incidents regularly recur. Second, a model of double-loop learning was apparent to a more limited
extent and then only by those who were accountable for safety in because of their formal roles.
Providing pathways for participation, encouraging input and giving feedback may informally enable a
greater number of individuals to engage more effectively in double-loop learning (Lukic, et al. 2013)
rather than relying on role specifications to stimulate safety learning in organizations. Third, the
observation of violations indicates the influence of prior learning of standard operating procedures
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through organizational training. This suggests strongly that while learning has occurred for some it is
either not universally embedded or that there has been a drift in day-to-day practice away from that
prescribed in the standard operating procedure.
Two other conclusions may also be drawn from this study. The data were drawn from a small
number of people over a short period of time, yet they contain a number of near-miss incidents that
exceed the numbers officially recorded. The accuracy of near-miss data to guide the development of
safety policy and practice may therefore be questionable. Finally, audio diaries may be used to
effectively gather data on safety practices in real time within organizations, providing rich qualitative
data to support our understanding of safe working.
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Table 1. Numbers of participants according to their rank and sector of employment.
Sector Diarist’s Rank within their Organisation
Frontline Supervisor Management Total Number of
Diarists
Logistics 5 2 2 9
Retail 8 3 1 12
Total Number
of Diarists 13 5 3 21
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Table 2. Number of reports of incidence of single-loop learning by different categories of staff in
retail and logistics organizations.
Role Category
Front-Line worker Supervisor Manager Total
Retail 28 8 0 36
Logistics 4 2 6 12
Total 32 10 6 48
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Table 3. Responses to different spilt items in retail settings.
Spilt Item Observation
Paint “a couple of colleagues were checking a tin of paint and the lid came off. That
was easily cleared up with a few paper towels, unlike the usual thing where we
have to get a trolley out and just put some compost down to soak all the paint
up”.
“we had a big paint spillage today, a lot of paint which would have caused a
slip hazard. It has been sorted straight away”.
Food “Somebody has spilt popcorn on the shop floor. Not the most exciting of things
but it had to be swept up and everything, and I had to let the manager know”.
“A child has spilt a drink of some sort onto the shop floor, but it was cleaned
up immediately and put with a ‘wet floor’ sign”.
Pencils “I noticed several pencils on the floor underneath one of the gondolas bearing
the catalogues. I am simply going to pick these up and put them away in their
correct place”.
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Table 4. Number of reports of incidence of double-loop learning by different categories of staff in
retail and logistics organizations.
Role Category
Front-Line worker Supervisor Manager Total
Retail 3 2 0 5
Logistics 5 0 3 8
Total 8 2 3 13
29
Figure 1. Model of possible safety learning opportunities arising from a ‘gap’ between an actual or
expected state or practice caused by errors, problems and violations (Inspired by Carroll et al.,
2002). Items in italics represent actions evident in the data either explicitly (fix problem/ escalate-
communicate) or implicitly (observation).
